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European Energy Markets
11JUN

Bruegel puts refill bill at EUR 35bn

3 min read
09:04UTC

The Brussels think tank's estimate is the most precise public figure for the 2026 injection campaign: 55% above 2025, requiring 180 extra LNG cargoes.

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EconomicDeveloping
Key takeaway

Reaching 80% storage requires 180 extra LNG cargoes at an estimated EUR 35 billion, 55% above 2025.

Bruegel, the Brussels-based economic think tank, estimated the cost of refilling EU gas storage to the revised target at EUR 35 billion at EUR 60/MWh, 55% above last year's equivalent costs. Europe needs approximately 180 additional LNG cargoes compared to last summer to reach the revised target by November. A gas price doubling from pre-crisis levels would add EUR 100 billion to the EU's annual import bill, which was EUR 117 billion last year.

Bruegel's policy recommendation includes an untested lever: a buyer coalition with Japan and South Korea, which together with the EU represents 60% of global LNG demand. Coordinated purchasing could counteract the cargo-by-cargo bidding war that currently favours sellers. No such coalition has been attempted at this scale, and the coordination challenges between three blocs with different regulatory frameworks and procurement cycles are substantial.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

A Brussels-based economic research organisation called Bruegel has calculated what it will cost Europe to refill its gas storage this summer. The answer is approximately EUR 35 billion, using current gas prices, and that is just to reach the newly lowered 80% target. Bruegel has also suggested that Europe should try to negotiate as a block with Japan and South Korea, the other major gas importers, to avoid all three bidding against each other for the same limited supply. If they compete separately, prices go up for everyone.

Deep Analysis
Root Causes

The EUR 35 billion refill cost reflects a structural illiquidity in the global LNG spot market. Unlike oil, where OPEC can release swing production within weeks, LNG supply is constrained by liquefaction train capacity that was committed 5-7 years earlier.

The US LNG expansion projects approved in 2019-21 (Sabine Pass Train 6, Calcasieu Pass, Plaquemines LNG) are coming online in 2025-26, but their output is 70-80% pre-committed under long-term contracts. The true spot market available to the EU is therefore a fraction of total Atlantic LNG output.

What could happen next?
  • Opportunity

    A coordinated EU-Japan-South Korea LNG buyer coalition could reduce spot cargo costs by 5-10% through demand aggregation, saving up to EUR 2-3.5 billion on the 180 additional cargo requirement.

  • Risk

    If all 180 additional cargoes must be sourced as spot, uncoordinated member state purchasing will replicate the 2022 competitive premium, pushing actual refill costs above Bruegel's EUR 35bn central estimate.

Sources:Bruegel
Mentions:Bruegel →European Union →Japan →South Korea →Prima →International Energy Agency →
First Reported In

Update #1 · Europe's thinnest gas cushion since 2018

Bruegel· 13 Apr 2026
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Causes and effects
This Event
Bruegel puts refill bill at EUR 35bn
The EUR 35 billion refill cost and 180-cargo requirement establish the fiscal and logistical scale of Europe's storage challenge, making it a budgetary fact for government procurement planning.
Led to
Bruegel resolves refill bill at EUR 26bn
Bruegel's three-scenario model resolves the EUR 35bn figure from ID:2363 as the mid-scenario (EUR 60/MWh), not the operative base case at current TTF.
Occurred 23 Apr 2026
Read story →
Germany net-withdrew 459 GWh on 13 April
Germany's continued net withdrawal undermines the Bruegel EUR 35bn refill estimate, which assumed Germany moving to net injection by mid-April.
Occurred 13 Apr 2026
Read story →
EU storage 32%, refill pace below target
Original Bruegel EUR 35bn refill estimate established the storage cost framework; the updated 32% fill figure and below-pace injection rate are measured against that benchmark.
Occurred 28 Apr 2026
Read story →
Storage 35.4% met, 80% trajectory missed
The Commission's April cut of the storage target from 90% to 80% sets the 80% November reference that the 0.257 pp/day floor is calculated against.
Occurred 12 May 2026
Read story →
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