7JUN

Zelenskyy reveals ten offshore factories

2 min read

11:27UTC

Ukraine's wartime export ban is fracturing. One manufacturer sold 1,000 interceptors for $3.5 million while holding a EUR 300 million state contract.

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Key takeaway

Grey-market factories signal Ukraine's export ban is fracturing under commercial pressure.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy disclosed on 28 March that approximately 10 drone factories have been built abroad to circumvent Ukraine's wartime export ban.¹ One company sold 1,000 interceptor drones to a foreign buyer for $3.5 million while simultaneously holding a EUR 300 million state production contract. At least one European country purchased drones without warheads and then requested Ukrainian operators to accompany them.

The economics explain the leakage. Ukrainian interceptors cost $2,500 to $5,000 per unit.² A PAC-3 Patriot interceptor costs $13.5 million. That price ratio makes Ukrainian systems irresistible to any buyer facing drone threats, and demand from 11 nations remains blocked by the export ban . Manufacturers with excess capacity and uncertain state payment timelines have rational incentives to seek foreign hard-currency buyers.

Ukraine can technically build 1,000 interceptors per day but is budget-limited to roughly half that. The funding gap, perhaps $5 million to $10 million daily, represents the difference between a cottage industry and a global export platform. Zelenskyy warned the "window of opportunity" is narrowing: private manufacturers are outpacing state coordination.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Ukraine bans the export of its drones because it is still at war and does not want its most effective weapons reaching enemy hands. But the manufacturers making these drones need cash now, not promises from a government with constrained budgets. So roughly 10 factories have been built outside Ukraine in secret, allowing the drones to be sold to foreign buyers without technically violating the export ban. Zelenskyy revealed this publicly, which is unusual. It signals he sees both the problem (the state is losing control of its most valuable technology) and an opportunity (these exports could become a significant revenue source if formalised).

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The export ban was enacted in 2022 as a wartime security measure to prevent battlefield-proven designs from reaching adversaries. The problem is that Ukrainian drone manufacturers have matured from cottage workshops into industrial producers, and the state payment infrastructure has not kept pace.

When a manufacturer holds a EUR 300 million state contract but also sells 1,000 units abroad for $3.5 million, the state contract is providing production certainty while the export sale provides cash flow. This is structurally identical to how Soviet-era arms exporters operated in the 1980s: state backing for capacity, grey market for liquidity.

What could happen next?

Risk
Grey-market drone exports undermine Ukraine's ability to control proliferation of its most advanced battlefield technologies, with no guarantee buyers' security practices are adequate.
Immediate · High
Opportunity
Lifting or restructuring the export ban could generate $2–3 billion annually in hard currency revenue, reducing Ukraine's dependence on Western military aid.
Short term · Medium
Consequence
The existence of 10 shadow factories signals that Ukrainian drone manufacturers are already operating as a de facto global defence export industry without state oversight.
Immediate · High
Precedent
If Ukraine formalises exports, it establishes the first wartime-proven small-drone export market, reshaping the global defence procurement landscape for sub-$10,000 strike systems.
Long term · Medium

Source Landscape

This story draws on centre-leaning sources from Ukraine

Ukraine

LeftRight

Primary parallel: Israel's arms export policies after the 1973 Yom Kippur War showed that a country under existential pressure can convert wartime innovation into a sustainable defence export industry within five to seven years, but only with strong state licensing infrastructure; Israel's success required SIBAT (the defence export directorate) to control and vet all transactions.

Counter-parallel: Ukraine's parallel in the 1990s arms export chaos is cautionary. Post-Soviet Ukraine sold Kh-55 cruise missiles to Iran and China in 2001 under similar circumstances of weak enforcement and manufacturer financial pressure; the technology transferred proved strategically damaging.

The economics are staggering. Ukrainian interceptors at $2,500–$5,000 per unit versus $13.5 million for a PAC-3 Patriot represents a 2,700-to-5,400 times cost advantage.

If Ukraine regularised even 10% of its production capacity at market prices, the revenue would rival Western military aid. A country that can produce 1,000 interceptors per day at $3,500 average price could generate $1.28 billion monthly in export revenue. Even at 20% of capacity, that is $256 million monthly, or roughly $3 billion annually — comparable to the annual US aid package.

Consensus view: IISS director general Bastian Giegerich argues that Ukraine's export ban was always economically unstable: the gap between production capacity and state payment timelines creates rational incentives for manufacturers to seek alternative buyers, and no export control regime survives sustained commercial pressure without enforcement resources.

Counter-view: RUSI senior research fellow Justin Bronk argues that grey-market exports create serious intelligence risks: drone technologies circulating outside Ukrainian state channels can end up with actors whose alignment with Western interests is ambiguous, as occurred with surplus Soviet equipment in the 1990s.

Key tension: Whether formalising exports would generate more revenue and state control than the current grey market, at the cost of enabling adversary drone acquisition.

Sources:Euromaidan Press

Mentions:Volodymyr Zelenskyy →Ukraine →

First Reported In

Update #3 · Anduril wins $20 billion counter-drone deal

Euromaidan Press· 30 Mar 2026

Read original →

Causes and effects

Caused by

Eleven nations seek Ukraine's drone tech

Zelenskyy's shadow factory disclosure directly referenced the wartime export ban (ID:1238) that the factories were built to circumvent.

Reported 19 Mar 2026

Read story →

This Event

Zelenskyy reveals ten offshore factories

Exposes a grey-market export channel that could become the foundation of a major Ukrainian defence industry.

Led to

Ukraine blocks drone sales as Gulf burns

Zelenskyy's shadow factory disclosure (ID:1738) revealed the export control pressure; the SSEC formal suspension is the regulatory mechanism enforcing the same strategic logic.

Occurred 7 Apr 2026

Read story →

Different Perspectives

Denmark (host nation)

Denmark accepted Fire Point's Skrydstrup plant after committing to bilateral defence co-production at the B9 Nordic summit in May; the facility sits beside a Danish F-35 base, sharing security perimeters. NATO has published no legal guidance on whether hosting Ukrainian weapons production converts Denmark into a co-belligerent, leaving the host-state obligation unresolved.

Russian Ministry of Defence

Russia's 117% YoY drone-output rise in April, accelerating from a 68% full-year 2025 baseline, validates the FPV mass-production doctrine and hands Moscow a cleaner targeting argument for the Skrydstrup plant than any hidden production line offered; a Ukrainian weapons facility on NATO sovereign territory is a legitimate military target under the laws of armed conflict.

Baltic NATO states (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania)

Latvia deployed mobile drone-intercept teams on 29 May using domestic Origin Robotics and Eraser interceptors, the first kinetic Baltic border response to Russia's 117% output surge. The Baltic states are the primary target market for Ukraine's ten EU export offices, giving them direct commercial access to combat-tested interceptors their own manufacturers have not yet matched.

Pentagon / Joint Interagency Task Force 401

Two Ukrainian entrants in Drone Dominance Phase 2 and Red Cat's SEC-filed STE partnership bring combat-iterated Ukrainian designs into US procurement without triggering Foreign Military Sale approvals; the programme's performance-scoring methodology does not require US-origin hardware. Northrop holding the Common UAS Payload standard means a heritage prime captures interface revenue regardless of which startup airframe wins.

Ukrainian defence industry (Fire Point / Spetstechnoexport)

Fire Point's Skrydstrup construction start and Spetstechnoexport's Red Cat partnership execute Zelensky's 13 May Bucharest proposal: converting wartime production surplus into a state export apparatus, independent of US approval chains. For Ukraine, embedded manufacturing on NATO soil protects propellant supply from Russian strikes while generating hard currency the war effort needs.

Chinese drone manufacturers (DJI, Autel)

Autel's Ralls Corp Fifth Amendment filing and DJI's Ninth Circuit quantification of USD 1.56 billion in 2026 losses are parallel constitutional attacks on a classified-evidence exclusion mechanism; neither company can contest the intelligence allegations directly, so both are betting on due-process doctrine to reopen the FCC authorisation route.