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Cybersecurity: Threats and Defences
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Europol seizes First VPN in Saffron raid

3 min read
16:08UTC

Europol's Operation Saffron seized 33 servers across 27 countries hosting First VPN, a service running since 2014 used by at least 25 ransomware gangs including Phobos and Avaddon. The administrator was located in Ukraine.

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Key takeaway

Europol's Operation Saffron seized First VPN's 33 servers, stripping anonymisation cover from at least 25 ransomware gangs.

Europol announced Operation Saffron on 21 May 2026, seizing 33 servers across 27 countries that hosted First VPN, a criminal anonymisation service running since 2014 1. At least 25 ransomware gangs used it to mask their operations, including Phobos and Avaddon, and the service's administrator was located in Ukraine 2.

First VPN sat in the plumbing of the ransomware economy rather than on its front line. Gangs route command-and-control traffic and victim communications through services like it to break the link between an attack and an identifiable operator, so seizing the hosting strips a layer of operational cover from every crew that depended on it. For investigators, the 33 servers are also an evidence haul: logs that could expose which gangs connected when.

Saffron follows a now-routine takedown shape. When the FBI and Michigan state Police seized the E-Note exchange in April , they pulled a money-laundering channel out from under ransomware crews without eliminating the operators who used it. Saffron repeats the shape at the anonymisation layer: a shared dependency removed, a temporary friction imposed, but no reduction in the affiliate supply that keeps the monthly attack count flat. Crews migrate to the next bulletproof host, and the displacement buys defenders time rather than relief.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Europol, the European Union's law enforcement agency, announced on 21 May 2026 that it had seized 33 servers belonging to a service called First VPN in a coordinated raid across 27 countries. First VPN was not a legitimate privacy service: it was specifically designed to help criminal ransomware gangs hide their identity and location while attacking victims. At least 25 different ransomware groups had used First VPN since 2014, including gangs called Phobos and Avaddon. Europol named the operation Saffron. While the seizure disrupts these groups immediately, criminal operators typically find alternative anonymisation services within a few weeks, meaning the long-term impact depends on follow-on arrests rather than the server seizures alone.

What could happen next?
  • Consequence

    Phobos and Avaddon affiliates will migrate to alternative criminal anonymisation services within two to four weeks based on prior VPNLab.net reconstitution timelines, restoring operational capacity without significantly reducing attack frequency.

    Short term · Assessed
  • Precedent

    Operation Saffron's 27-country coordination establishes a new geographic breadth record for criminal-infrastructure seizure, creating a framework that Europol may apply to other multi-jurisdictional criminal service providers in the anonymisation and bulletproof-hosting markets.

    Medium term · Suggested
  • Risk

    The absence of a named arrest in the Operation Saffron announcement, despite the administrator being located in Ukraine, leaves the core operator free to reconstitute the service under a different name and infrastructure, as occurred after VPNLab and DoubleVPN.

    Short term · Assessed
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