Khondab Heavy Water Complex
Iranian heavy water reactor complex whose JCPOA restrictions hinge on NPT membership.
Last refreshed: 30 March 2026 · Appears in 1 active topic
If Iran leaves the NPT, what stops Khondab resuming full plutonium production?
Latest on Khondab Heavy Water Complex
- What is the Khondab Heavy Water Complex?
- The Khondab Heavy Water Complex, near Arak in central Iran, is home to the IR-40 heavy-water reactor. Under the 2015 JCPOA, Iran redesigned the reactor to reduce its capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium, and the IAEA monitors the site.Source: IAEA / JCPOA text
- What happens to Khondab if Iran leaves the NPT?
- If Iran's parliamentary bill to leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty passes, all JCPOA restrictions on Khondab would be revoked. Iran could restart the reactor in its original, higher-yield plutonium configuration without any legal obligation to allow IAEA inspections.Source: Islamic Consultative Assembly
- Is Khondab the same as the Arak reactor?
- Yes. "Khondab" refers to the town near Arak where the facility is located. The complex is also known as the Arak heavy water reactor or IR-40. All three names refer to the same site.
- Can Khondab produce plutonium for a nuclear weapon?
- Before the JCPOA redesign, the IR-40 reactor's configuration was capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. The 2015 deal mandated modifications to reduce that output. If those restrictions are lifted, the facility's original design potential would be restored.Source: JCPOA Annex I
Background
The complex, located near Arak in central Iran, houses the IR-40 heavy-water reactor, which was partially redesigned under the 2015 JCPOA to reduce its capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium. Construction began in the 1990s and the facility also produces heavy water for export. The IAEA has monitored the site under the nuclear deal's modified arrangements.
Iran's Parliament filed priority legislation to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a move that would automatically revoke all JCPOA obligations governing the Khondab complex, including the mandatory redesign of its heavy-water reactor to limit plutonium output .
Khondab sits at the centre of the non-proliferation debate: even under the modified design, Western powers regard it as a dual-use asset capable of resuming plutonium production if political conditions change. An NPT exit would remove the legal architecture underpinning IAEA inspections and free Tehran to operate the reactor without international oversight, sharpening fears of a covert weapons path.
