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ArcaneDoor
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ArcaneDoor

2024 UAT-4356 espionage campaign on Cisco network devices; predecessor operation that evolved into FIRESTARTER.

The group behind ArcaneDoor returned with a harder-to-remove tool: on 24 April 2026 CISA and the UK's NCSC named FIRESTARTER, a backdoor in Cisco firewall startup code that survives every security patch.

Last refreshed: 12 October 2026 · Appears in 1 active topic

Key Question

How did ArcaneDoor teach UAT-4356 to build a backdoor that survives every patch?

Timeline for ArcaneDoor

#14 30 Sept
#4 14 May

Mentioned in: UAT-8616 keeps Cisco SD-WAN under fire

Cybersecurity: Threats and Defences
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Background

ArcaneDoor was a state-backed espionage campaign against Cisco ASA and Firepower firewalls, disclosed in 2024. Cisco Talos attributed it to UAT-4356, a government-backed group whose sponsoring state has not been formally named. The campaign planted implants in the devices' volatile memory, which a standard reboot could clear, and prompted remediation guidance from Cisco and US and UK cyber agencies.

The campaign matters now because of what followed. UAT-4356 moved from ArcaneDoor's memory-resident implants to FIRESTARTER, which persists in the boot sequence, a deliberate investment against the remediation that defeated its first tool.

ArcaneDoor set the pattern: a capable state actor targeting network EDGE devices over several years, and improving its persistence between generations. The devices it first exposed remain a prime target. Cisco reached 100 entries on the US list of exploited software flaws on 30 September 2026, and all four of its September listings hit security products.

Key Issues
Cisco firewalls

The successor implant survives patching

A reboot cleared ArcaneDoor's implants in 2024. FIRESTARTER, named by CISA and the UK's National Cyber Security Centre on 24 April 2026, closes that gap: it hides in the startup code of Cisco firewalls and survives every security patch. One unnamed US government agency applied all patches on schedule and was still infected six months later.

The only cure is a full power-down and cold restart, so a routine patch job becomes a physical maintenance visit. Defenders WHO closed ArcaneDoor cases in 2024 with a reboot now face the same actor, UAT-4356, with a tool built to defeat exactly that fix.

Common Questions
What was the ArcaneDoor Cisco attack and who was responsible?
ArcaneDoor was a 2024 espionage campaign by the government-backed threat actor UAT-4356 targeting Cisco ASA and Firepower network EDGE devices. The campaign used volatile-memory-resident implants that a standard device reboot could remove. It was identified and disclosed by Cisco Talos.Source: Cisco Talos / CISA
How is ArcaneDoor different from the FIRESTARTER Cisco backdoor?
ArcaneDoor (2024) used volatile-memory implants cleared by rebooting the device. FIRESTARTER (2025-2026) embeds in the boot sequence and survives all reboots and patches; only a hard power cycle evicts it. Both campaigns were conducted by UAT-4356, with FIRESTARTER representing a direct capability escalation from ArcaneDoor.Source: CISA/NCSC advisory AA26-113A
Is ArcaneDoor linked to the same actors behind FIRESTARTER?
Yes. Both ArcaneDoor (2024) and FIRESTARTER (2026) are attributed to UAT-4356, the same government-backed threat actor tracked by Cisco Talos. The two campaigns are understood as successive generations of the same long-running persistent-access operation against Cisco network EDGE devices.Source: CISA/NCSC advisory AA26-113A
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