The Record
Is Britain Actually Broke?
What we told you to watch, what each side claimed, and what we got wrong. Every verdict shows its evidence.
Open 23 · Corrections 25
What we told you to watch
Still open · 23
OBR productivity path: On 28 October, the OBR's Budget forecast keeps underlying productivity growth at 1.0% a year by the end of its forecast, the figure it set in November 2025.
From the 22 Oct briefing · Deadline: 2026-10-28
DMO remit: On 28 October, the DMO's revised 2026-27 financing remit raises planned gross gilt sales above the total in the remit it replaces.
From the 22 Oct briefing · Deadline: 2026-10-28
Debt ratio, October: By 24 November, the ONS's first estimate for the end of October keeps public sector net debt below 95.0% of GDP.
From the 22 Oct briefing · Deadline: 2026-11-24
Household insolvency rate: By 20 November, the Insolvency Service puts the individual insolvency rate for the 12 months to October above September's 28.0 per 10,000 adults.
From the 22 Oct briefing · Deadline: 2026-11-20
13 October: the IMF's World Economic Outlook and Fiscal Monitor, the first World Economic Outlook UK debt figure since April .
From the 7 Oct briefing · Deadline: 13 October
28 October: the OBR forecast and the Budget, and the headroom figure they print against an £8.1bn overshoot, plus whether the 1.4% productivity assumption survives.
From the 7 Oct briefing · Deadline: 28 October
The ONS public finances for September, the half-year reading before the Budget: whether the overshoot widens past £8.1bn.
From the 7 Oct briefing
The Insolvency Service's September figures: whether bankruptcies and IVAs keep rising while the headline rate barely moves.
From the 7 Oct briefing
15/09/2026: whether ONS labour market figures keep real regular pay growth above zero, and whether vacancies fall below 707,000.
From the 3 Sept briefing
17/09/2026: MHCLG's first release of 2025-26 local authority revenue expenditure and financing, the first outturn view of what councils actually spent .
From the 3 Sept briefing
What each side claimed
Claims are what a named side said at the time. We record them as said and judge them only against later evidence.
No claims recorded yet.
What we got wrong
- MinorCorrected 22 Oct 2026We said
The 28 October EFO would test whether the OBR's 1.4% productivity assumption survives.
What was trueThe 1.4% figure is the average productivity growth assumed over the next 50 years in the OBR's July 2026 Fiscal risks and sustainability report. The 28 October Economic and fiscal outlook tests the medium-term path; the March 2026 EFO had underlying productivity growth reaching 1.0% a year by the end of its forecast. A medium-term downgrade could feed into the next long-term projection, but the October EFO does not directly retest the 1.4% fifty-year average.
- MinorCorrected 22 Oct 2026We said
The 28 October EFO would test whether the OBR keeps its 1.4% long-run productivity assumption.
What was trueThe 1.4% figure is the average productivity growth assumed over the next 50 years in the OBR's July 2026 Fiscal risks and sustainability report. The 28 October Economic and fiscal outlook tests the medium-term path; the March 2026 EFO had underlying productivity growth reaching 1.0% a year by the end of its forecast. A medium-term downgrade could feed into the next long-term projection, but the October EFO does not directly retest the 1.4% fifty-year average.
- MinorCorrected 22 Oct 2026We said
The 28 October EFO would test whether the OBR cuts its 1.4% long-run productivity assumption.
What was trueThe 1.4% figure is the average productivity growth assumed over the next 50 years in the OBR's July 2026 Fiscal risks and sustainability report. The 28 October Economic and fiscal outlook tests the medium-term path; the March 2026 EFO had underlying productivity growth reaching 1.0% a year by the end of its forecast. A medium-term downgrade could feed into the next long-term projection, but the October EFO does not directly retest the 1.4% fifty-year average.
- MinorCorrected 22 Oct 2026We said
The next fiscal event would test whether the OBR cuts its 1.4% long-run productivity assumption.
What was trueThe 1.4% figure is the average productivity growth assumed over the next 50 years in the OBR's July 2026 Fiscal risks and sustainability report. The 28 October Economic and fiscal outlook tests the medium-term path; the March 2026 EFO had underlying productivity growth reaching 1.0% a year by the end of its forecast. A medium-term downgrade could feed into the next long-term projection, but the October EFO does not directly retest the 1.4% fifty-year average.
- MinorCorrected 22 Oct 2026We said
The £10.3bn Defence Investment Plan.
What was trueThe plan adds £15bn; £10.3bn of its funding was identified on 30 June 2026.
- MinorCorrected 22 Oct 2026We said
A £10.3bn Defence Investment Plan funding breakdown; a 1p capital budget cut.
What was trueA breakdown of the £15bn plan identifying £10.3bn; a 1% cut to departmental capital budgets.
- MinorCorrected 22 Oct 2026We said
The defence plan is worth £10.3bn.
What was trueThe plan adds £15bn over 2026-27 to 2029-30; £10.3bn is the funding identified on 30 June 2026, with £4.7bn left to Budget 2026.
- MinorCorrected 22 Oct 2026We said
Assets of £1,112.6bn in July 2026.
What was trueThe figures are as at 30 June 2026 (July update).
- MinorCorrected 22 Oct 2026We said
The PPF 7800 showed 131.1% and £264.0bn in July 2026.
What was true131.1% and £264.0bn are as at 30 June 2026, published in the July 2026 update; at 31 July the index was 133.0%.
- MinorCorrected 7 Oct 2026We said
The Telegraph, relaying Newsquawk, reports that the Bank of England will stop active sales of 20- and 30-year gilts.
What was trueThe Telegraph made the report and Newsquawk relayed it, as event 6213 and the update body already say.