Skip to content
Briefings are running a touch slower this week while we rebuild the foundations.See roadmap
Iran Conflict 2026
28FEB

Iraqi militias threaten; hold fire Day 1

1 min read
19:00UTC

Iraqi Shia militia groups threatened retaliation against US military assets in Iraq and across the region following the 28 February 2026 strikes on Iran but had not attacked by end of day.

ConflictDeveloping
Key takeaway

Iraqi militia restraint on 28 February likely reflects a combination of Iranian command disruption and calculation about the Iraqi government's tolerance for proxy attacks launched from its territory.

The threatening-but-holding posture of Iraqi militias on 28 February is consistent with a pattern established through 2024 and 2025: issue credible warnings, observe the US response, and calibrate action to avoid triggering direct US strikes on Iraqi sovereign territory or militia leadership.

Iraq presents a particular constraint for proxy activation. The Iraqi government — which includes both pro-Iranian and pro-Western factions — has limited tolerance for militia attacks that use Iraqi soil as a launch platform, because such attacks invite US retaliation into Iraqi territory and destabilise the central government. Militia commanders are balancing Axis of Resistance obligations against the political cost of acting in ways the Iraqi prime minister cannot defend to parliament.

The restraint may also reflect the same command disruption affecting Hezbollah: if Pakpour is confirmed dead and Quds Force command is in disarray, Iraqi militias lack the real-time coordination and authorisation they would normally receive from Tehran before a major activation. Standing orders can initiate attacks, but calibrated, multi-target operations against US bases in multiple countries require live direction.

What could happen next?
  • Meaning

  • Meaning

First Reported In

Update #2 · Five cities struck on opening night

Al Jazeera· 28 Feb 2026
Read original
Different Perspectives
IAEA
IAEA
Director General Rafael Grossi appeared in person at the UNSC on 19 May and warned that a direct hit on an operating reactor 'could result in very high release of radioactivity'. The session produced a condemnation record but no resolution, and the Barakah perimeter was already struck on 17 May.
Hengaw (Kurdish rights monitor)
Hengaw (Kurdish rights monitor)
Hengaw documented three judicial executions and the detention of Kurdish writer Majid Karimi in Tehran on 19 May, establishing Khorasan Razavi province as the newest geography in Iran's wartime judicial record. The organisation's Norway-based operation continues to surface a domestic repression track running in parallel with every diplomatic and military development.
India
India
Six India-flagged vessels conducted a coordinated cluster transit under PGSA bilateral assurances during the 17 May window, paying no yuan tolls. New Delhi's inclusion in Iran's state-to-state passage track insulates Indian energy supply without requiring endorsement of the PGSA's yuan-toll architecture or alignment with the US coalition.
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan is the only functioning diplomatic bridge between Tehran and Washington. Its role is relay, not mediation in the settlement sense: it conveyed Iran's 10-point counter-MOU in early May, relayed the US rejection, and is now passing 'corrective points' in the third documented exchange of this sub-cycle without either side working from a shared text.
UK and France (Northwood coalition)
UK and France (Northwood coalition)
Twenty-six coalition members have published no rules of engagement eight days after the Bahrain joint statement; Lloyd's underwriters have conditioned war-risk reopening on written ROE from either Iran or the coalition. Italian and French mine-countermeasures deployments are operating on the in-water clearance task CENTCOM Admiral Brad Cooper's 90% mine-stockpile claim does not address.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Riyadh has not publicly commented on the Barakah strike or the 50-47 discharge vote. Saudi output feeds the IEA's $106 base case; the $5 Brent premium above that model reflects institutional uncertainty no Gulf producer can compress through supply adjustment alone.