The rally-round-the-flag prediction rested on the Iran-Iraq War as its primary historical analogue. In September 1980, Saddam Hussein's invasion triggered a genuine national mobilisation: Iranians who had opposed the revolution nonetheless picked up arms to defend their country from a foreign aggressor. The prediction assumed this pattern would repeat in 2026.
The critical variable is the state of the regime-population relationship at the moment of external attack. In 1980, the Islamic Republic was eighteen months old and still carried genuine popular energy — even if already fracturing. In 2026, the republic was forty-seven years old and had accumulated four decades of economic mismanagement, political repression, and demonstrated indifference to its population's welfare.
The December 2025 protest cycle was not merely a continuation of the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests. By available accounts, it was substantially larger — described as the largest since the 1979 revolution — and had been sustained for three months before the strikes. The January 2026 massacre had not suppressed the movement; it had intensified it. The regime had attempted lethal force and failed to restore order. By 28 February, the population had concluded that the regime was its enemy.
Externally imposed destruction of a government one already wishes to see destroyed does not generate nationalist solidarity. It generates relief. The fireworks and 'Death to Khamenei' chants on 28 February are the predictable outcome of a regime that had exhausted its domestic legitimacy before the first missile was launched.
