14JUN

Germany net-withdrew 459 GWh on 13 April

3 min read

11:42UTC

Four days into the injection season the EU's largest storage estate is still drawing down, not refilling.

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Key takeaway

Germany is still emptying, not filling, and cannot accelerate its way out later.

Bundesnetzagentur-fed AGSI+ data shows Germany recorded a net gas storage withdrawal of 459 GWh on the 13 April gas day, leaving national storage at 23.27%, fractionally below the 23.32% posted on 12 April ¹. Four days into what should have flipped to sustained injection, the country's cavern network was still running a net draw.

German injection capacity is fixed at 4,274 GWh/day against 7,047 GWh/day of withdrawal; the asymmetry means the pipelines can empty the caverns faster than they can fill them. A late start is not recoverable by acceleration, only by running closer to the injection ceiling for longer, which leaves no headroom for the next supply shock.

The EU aggregate is still on pace against the reduced November target , but it is running on periphery injection while the anchor drifts. Bruegel's refill estimate assumed Germany at net-injection by mid-April; that assumption has not held.

For winter-26 gas portfolios, this is the only domestic data point on the calendar that matters as much as the Hormuz ceasefire call ; it is also the only one that cannot be hedged with a headline.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Gas storage works like a giant underground tank that Europe fills during summer when demand is low, then draws down during winter when heating demand is high. By early April the heating season should be winding down and the refilling should have started. Germany has the biggest gas storage network in the EU, so its behaviour sets the pace for the whole bloc. On 13 April it was still drawing gas out (459 GWh net), not putting it in, even though the storage season officially began on 1 April. That is a problem because Germany's filling equipment can only push gas in so fast. A late start cannot be made up by filling faster later. The tank is already unusually empty at 23.27%, about half the level it would be at this time in a normal year.

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

Germany's storage deficit has two structural causes distinct from the current Hormuz crisis. First, the Nord Stream pipeline destruction in September 2022 removed roughly 55 bcm per year of German-destined capacity, forcing Germany onto spot LNG and Norwegian pipeline at premium prices and preventing the pre-winter fill rates achievable before 2022.

Second, Germany's cavern storage geology (predominantly salt caverns with fast-cycle capability) means its working gas volumes are disproportionately small relative to its consumption. France and Italy hold a higher share of depleted-field storage with larger working volumes; Germany's estate is sized for rapid response, not strategic reserve depth.

What could happen next?

Risk
If Germany remains in net withdrawal through late April, EU aggregate storage will miss the trajectory required for 80% by November, even with the target reduced from 90% (ID:2355).
Consequence
Industrial demand curtailment orders in Germany, the EU's largest manufacturing economy, would amplify Cefic's reported 37Mt capacity loss by depressing output further in chemicals, steel, and glass.

Source Landscape

This story draws on neutral-leaning sources

Primary parallel: In the 2021 injection season Germany also failed to flip to net injection in the first week of April, eventually closing the year at 62%, the lowest pre-winter level since 2017. The subsequent winter required demand-side management orders and temporary lignite plant extensions. The structural mechanism is the same: cold spring depresses heating demand switch-off, delaying injection start.

Counter-parallel: In April 2018 Germany ran an even later injection start but reached 94% by November on the back of lower-than-forecast summer temperatures and high Norwegian supply. A cooler, windier summer is the recovery scenario, but it depends on demand not consuming the injection capacity that the Bundeswirtschaftsministerium's early warning stage signals are already constrained.

The 459 GWh net withdrawal on 13 April, if sustained, represents roughly EUR 19 million per day in gas drawn from inventory at EUR 42/MWh. Each percentage point of storage equates to approximately 2.5 TWh for Germany specifically.

At current injection capacity of 4,274 GWh/day, Germany would need the full estate running at maximum rate from late April to reach 80% by 1 November.

That assumes zero further withdrawal days, no unplanned maintenance on injection compressors, and TTF below EUR 50/MWh (the threshold at which industrial demand reduction kicks in and frees injection capacity). The Bruegel EUR 35bn estimate used EUR 60/MWh; at EUR 42/MWh, the refill cost reduces, but the physical volume problem remains unchanged.

Consensus view: Bruegel senior fellow Georg Zachmann and Agora Energiewende analysts assess that Germany's asymmetric injection-withdrawal capacity (4,274 GWh/day injection versus roughly 7,000 GWh/day withdrawal) creates a structural ratchet: withdrawal deficits from a cold April cannot be recovered by faster injection because injection capacity is the binding constraint.

A late injection start in mid-April means Germany will trail the EU aggregate trajectory for at least six weeks .

Counter-view: The Bundesnetzagentur argues that the 23.27% reading overstates the shortfall because it does not account for the linepack in the transmission system, and that Germany has contractual access to Norwegian pipeline capacity that is not reflected in AGSI+ storage numbers. The regulator has pointed to line-pack as a de facto additional buffer since 2022.

Key tension: Whether linepack and Norwegian interconnect capacity represent real flexibility or a rounding error against a 50+ TWh injection shortfall relative to the five-year average.

Sources:Gas Infrastructure Europe

Mentions:Bundesnetzagentur →GIE AGSI+ →Germany →Bruegel →Prima →Bundeswirtschaftsministerium →

First Reported In

Update #2 · TTF EUR 42 as Russian LNG ban enters range

Gas Infrastructure Europe· 15 Apr 2026

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Causes and effects

Caused by

German storage deficit deepest in EU

Germany's net withdrawal of 459 GWh on 13 April worsens below the 23.32% storage level recorded on 12 April, extending the failure to begin injection.

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Bruegel puts refill bill at EUR 35bn

Germany's continued net withdrawal undermines the Bruegel EUR 35bn refill estimate, which assumed Germany moving to net injection by mid-April.

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Germany net-withdrew 459 GWh on 13 April

A late German injection start cannot be recovered by faster pipelines later; the window is hardware-constrained.

Led to

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Germany's 13 April net withdrawal of 459 GWh compounded the Reden booking failure, confirming the commercial injection mechanism had not recovered.

Occurred 1 Apr 2026

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EU needs 469 TWh injection, 39 extra cargoes

Germany's 13 April net withdrawal of 459 GWh, still unresolved, is the binding constraint on the 469 TWh target.

Occurred 22 Apr 2026

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Germany triples injection rate into ban day

Germany's acceleration to 745 GWh injection on 25 April resolves the net-withdrawal condition recorded in ID:2422 on 13 April.

Occurred 25 Apr 2026

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