Mohammadmahdi Maleki
Iranian national in Belarus; designated 8 May 2026 for role in CITC arms-procurement network.
Last refreshed: 10 May 2026 · Appears in 1 active topic
Who is the Iranian national running Iran's arms network from Minsk?
Timeline for Mohammadmahdi Maleki
Mentioned in: OFAC sanctions China's biggest SAR satellite firm
Iran Conflict 2026- Who is Mohammadmahdi Maleki and why was he sanctioned?
- Mohammadmahdi Maleki is an Iranian national based in Belarus designated by OFAC on 8 May 2026 under the Iran conventional-arms transfer executive order. He is linked to Iran's CITC procurement network and its Belarusian node, Armory Alliance LLC.Source: OFAC
- What does Mohammadmahdi Maleki do in Belarus?
- Maleki is believed to have served as the operative managing the CITC arms-procurement network's Eastern European logistics axis, liaising between Iranian procurement requirements and Armory Alliance LLC's Belarusian operations.Source: OFAC
- Why did Iran send a procurement operative to Belarus?
- Belarus's geographic position, Soviet-era defence-industrial base, and willingness to host sanctions evasion make it an ideal hub for Iranian procurement of dual-use electronics and optics. Maleki's presence indicates direct Iranian management of the supply chain.Source: OFAC
Background
Mohammadmahdi Maleki is an Iranian national based in Belarus who was designated by OFAC on 8 May 2026 under the IRAN-CON-ARMS-EO executive order as a key individual in the CITC arms-procurement network. His presence in Belarus, operating alongside Belarusian national Mohammed Ali Tolibov, suggests he was a CITC-linked operative managing the network's Eastern European logistics axis, potentially serving as a liaison between Iranian procurement requirements and Armory Alliance LLC's sourcing operations.
Maleki's designation as an individual alongside the corporate entities in the 8 May action is consistent with OFAC's practice of targeting both the institutional and personal layers of a sanctions-evasion network simultaneously. Designating individuals prevents the corporate structure from continuing under new names or ownership while the individual operators remain free to rebuild. Maleki's Iranian nationality combined with his Belarus posting places him at the intersection of the CITC's geographic evasion architecture, bridging the Iranian principal and the Eastern European logistics node.
As a newly designated individual, publicly available information on Maleki is limited to what appears in the OFAC designation record. His role in the network is documented through the procurement links OFAC traced rather than through his own public statements or biographical record. The designation means any individual or company worldwide that knowingly facilitates transactions with Maleki faces secondary-sanctions risk.
