The threatening-but-holding posture of Iraqi militias on 28 February is consistent with a pattern established through 2024 and 2025: issue credible warnings, observe the US response, and calibrate action to avoid triggering direct US strikes on Iraqi sovereign territory or militia leadership.
Iraq presents a particular constraint for proxy activation. The Iraqi government — which includes both pro-Iranian and pro-Western factions — has limited tolerance for militia attacks that use Iraqi soil as a launch platform, because such attacks invite US retaliation into Iraqi territory and destabilise the central government. Militia commanders are balancing Axis of Resistance obligations against the political cost of acting in ways the Iraqi prime minister cannot defend to parliament.
The restraint may also reflect the same command disruption affecting Hezbollah: if Pakpour is confirmed dead and Quds Force command is in disarray, Iraqi militias lack the real-time coordination and authorisation they would normally receive from Tehran before a major activation. Standing orders can initiate attacks, but calibrated, multi-target operations against US bases in multiple countries require live direction.
