22JUN

Zelenskyy reveals ten offshore factories

2 min read

13:56UTC

Ukraine's wartime export ban is fracturing. One manufacturer sold 1,000 interceptors for $3.5 million while holding a €300 million state contract.

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Key takeaway

Grey-market factories signal Ukraine's export ban is fracturing under commercial pressure.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy disclosed on 28 March that approximately 10 drone factories have been built abroad to circumvent Ukraine's wartime export ban.⁠¹ One company sold 1,000 interceptor drones to a foreign buyer for $3.5 million while simultaneously holding a €300 million state production contract. At least one European country purchased drones without warheads and then requested Ukrainian operators to accompany them.

The economics explain the leakage. Ukrainian interceptors cost $2,500 to $5,000 per unit.⁠² A PAC-3 Patriot interceptor costs $13.5 million. That price ratio makes Ukrainian systems irresistible to any buyer facing drone threats, and demand from 11 nations remains blocked by the export ban. Manufacturers with excess capacity and uncertain state payment timelines have rational incentives to seek foreign hard-currency buyers.

Ukraine can technically build 1,000 interceptors per day but is budget-limited to roughly half that. The funding gap, perhaps $5 million to $10 million daily, represents the difference between a cottage industry and a global export platform. Zelenskyy warned the "window of opportunity" is narrowing: private manufacturers are outpacing state coordination.

Deep Analysis

In plain English

Ukraine bans the export of its drones because it is still at war and does not want its most effective weapons reaching enemy hands. But the manufacturers making these drones need cash now, not promises from a government with constrained budgets. So roughly 10 factories have been built outside Ukraine in secret, allowing the drones to be sold to foreign buyers without technically violating the export ban. Zelenskyy revealed this publicly, which is unusual. It signals he sees both the problem (the state is losing control of its most valuable technology) and an opportunity (these exports could become a significant revenue source if formalised).

Deep Analysis

Root Causes

The export ban was enacted in 2022 as a wartime security measure to prevent battlefield-proven designs from reaching adversaries. The problem is that Ukrainian drone manufacturers have matured from cottage workshops into industrial producers, and the state payment infrastructure has not kept pace.

When a manufacturer holds a €300 million state contract but also sells 1,000 units abroad for $3.5 million, the state contract is providing production certainty while the export sale provides cash flow. This is structurally identical to how Soviet-era arms exporters operated in the 1980s: state backing for capacity, grey market for liquidity.

What could happen next?

Risk
Grey-market drone exports undermine Ukraine's ability to control proliferation of its most advanced battlefield technologies, with no guarantee buyers' security practices are adequate.
Immediate · High
Opportunity
Lifting or restructuring the export ban could generate $2–3 billion annually in hard currency revenue, reducing Ukraine's dependence on Western military aid.
Short term · Medium
Consequence
The existence of 10 shadow factories signals that Ukrainian drone manufacturers are already operating as a de facto global defence export industry without state oversight.
Immediate · High
Precedent
If Ukraine formalises exports, it establishes the first wartime-proven small-drone export market, reshaping the global defence procurement landscape for sub-$10,000 strike systems.
Long term · Medium

Source Landscape

This story draws on mixed-leaning sources from Ukraine

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LeftRight

Primary parallel: Israel's arms export policies after the 1973 Yom Kippur War showed that a country under existential pressure can convert wartime innovation into a sustainable defence export industry within five to seven years, but only with strong state licensing infrastructure; Israel's success required SIBAT (the defence export directorate) to control and vet all transactions.

Counter-parallel: Ukraine's parallel in the 1990s arms export chaos is cautionary. Post-Soviet Ukraine sold Kh-55 cruise missiles to Iran and China in 2001 under similar circumstances of weak enforcement and manufacturer financial pressure; the technology transferred proved strategically damaging.

The economics are staggering. Ukrainian interceptors at $2,500–$5,000 per unit versus $13.5 million for a PAC-3 Patriot represents a 2,700-to-5,400 times cost advantage.

If Ukraine regularised even 10% of its production capacity at market prices, the revenue would rival Western military aid. A country that can produce 1,000 interceptors per day at $3,500 average price could generate $1.28 billion monthly in export revenue. Even at 20% of capacity, that is $256 million monthly, or roughly $3 billion annually — comparable to the annual US aid package.

Consensus view: IISS director general Bastian Giegerich argues that Ukraine's export ban was always economically unstable: the gap between production capacity and state payment timelines creates rational incentives for manufacturers to seek alternative buyers, and no export control regime survives sustained commercial pressure without enforcement resources.

Counter-view: RUSI senior research fellow Justin Bronk argues that grey-market exports create serious intelligence risks: drone technologies circulating outside Ukrainian state channels can end up with actors whose alignment with Western interests is ambiguous, as occurred with surplus Soviet equipment in the 1990s.

Key tension: Whether formalising exports would generate more revenue and state control than the current grey market, at the cost of enabling adversary drone acquisition.

Sources:Euromaidan Press·The Kyiv Post

Mentions:Volodymyr Zelenskyy →Ukraine →Yom Kippur War →

First Reported In

Update #3 · Anduril wins $20 billion counter-drone deal

Euromaidan Press· 30 Mar 2026

Read original →

Causes and effects

Caused by

Eleven nations seek Ukraine's drone tech

Zelenskyy's shadow factory disclosure directly referenced the wartime export ban that the factories were built to circumvent.

Reported 19 Mar 2026

Read story →

This Event

Zelenskyy reveals ten offshore factories

Exposes a grey-market export channel that could become the foundation of a major Ukrainian defence industry.

Led to

Ukraine blocks drone sales as Gulf burns

Zelenskyy's shadow factory disclosure revealed the export control pressure; the SSEC formal suspension is the regulatory mechanism enforcing the same strategic logic.

Occurred 7 Apr 2026

Read story →

Different Perspectives

Cross-border power traders

The France-Germany day-ahead spread flipped from a EUR 17.20 German premium on 1 August to a EUR 4.15 French premium on 3 August, the same day French curtailment peaked. They cannot yet attribute the flip to curtailment alone, since a like-for-like overnight comparison shows French nuclear output rising while wind fell and demand returned on the weekday step.

EDF

River-cooling limits took 7.6 GW, 12 per cent of its fleet, offline on 3 August, the highest curtailment since the heatwave began, with an easing forecast to 4.3 GW on 4 August and 3 GW after. It manages the cut as a recurring seasonal constraint, expecting it to lift with river temperature, not repair.

Gasunie

TTF, the Dutch hub it operates, drifted to roughly EUR 55 to 58 per MWh across the window, staying inside its recent range through both the German spark reversal and the French curtailment. It reads a flat hub price as evidence that neither event this window carried enough weight to move the fuel leg on its own.

German gas-fired generators

Record German solar of 18,761 MW on 2 August pushed the clean spark spread to minus 18.48 EUR/MWh, a loss-making day, before it returned to plus 16.20 on 3 August. They now price dispatch against post-solar residual load rather than wind alone, since the sign flipped inside 48 hours on unchanged fuel and carbon costs.

European Commission (DG Energy)

Its implementing-measures register logged transposition notices from only Portugal and Slovakia against Wednesday's Article 94 deadline for Directive (EU) 2024/1788, with 25 states silent. It expects the register to fill only gradually, since filing routinely lags legislating and any infringement track against non-notifying states runs on a slower clock than the deadline itself.

Spain's LNG terminal operators

Spain's 9,145 GWh terminal inventory is the largest single stock in the EU LNG network, an option value that can reroute cargoes wherever the winter strip pays best rather than a cavern gas obligation tied to a fixed date. That flexibility matters more as Germany's cavern shortfall pushes more of the winter security question onto import infrastructure.

Written with AI from Lowdown's published reporting. Not individually reviewed by an editor. Editorial standards.