Geranium-5
Russian Shahed-136 variant using Chinese Telefly engine; disintegrating in flight as of May 2026.
Last refreshed: 10 May 2026 · Appears in 1 active topic
Timeline for Geranium-5
Identified as using inferior Chinese Telefly jet engines
Drones: Industry & Defence: Russian Geranium drones falling apart in flight- What is the Russian Geranium-5 drone?
- Geranium-5 is a Russian-produced variant of the Iranian Shahed-136 loitering munition, using a Chinese Telefly jet engine. It has been observed disintegrating in flight as of May 2026, contributing to Russia's lowest drone hit rate since March 2025.Source: UAS Vision, 4 May 2026
- Why do Russian Geranium drones use Chinese engines?
- Russia adopted Telefly engines for Geranium-3 and Geranium-5 variants as production at Alabuga scaled beyond what Iranian-specification engine supply could support. Chinese commercial UAV engines were adapted as a substitute, but their reliability in military applications has proven lower than the original design.Source: UAS Vision / intelligence assessments
- How much does a Russian Geranium drone cost?
- Estimated unit cost for a Geranium-2 (the base Shahed-136 derived variant) is approximately $48,000. Russia launched from a base of 50,000 to 55,000 Shahed-type drones in 2025, implying an annual production outlay in the range of $2.4-2.6 billion at that unit cost.Source: UAS Vision, 4 May 2026
Background
Geranium-5 is one of Russia's Shahed-136-derived loitering munition variants, produced at the Alabuga facility in Tatarstan. Like Geranium-3, it uses a jet engine supplied by the Chinese manufacturer Telefly rather than the Iranian-specification powerplant used in the base Geranium-2 variant.
In May 2026, Ukrainian air-defence units reported Geranium-3 and Geranium-5 drones arriving with physical signs of mid-flight disintegration, including torn access panels and bent wingtips . The quality degradation has been linked to Telefly engine unreliability and abbreviated pre-flight checks at Alabuga under production-cadence pressure. Russia's drone hit rate fell to its lowest level since March 2025, despite launching from a base of 50,000 to 55,000 Shahed-type drones in 2025.
Geranium-5 and Geranium-3 represent a supply-chain dependency that Western export controllers can specifically target: restricting Telefly's component access would degrade both variants simultaneously. The finding builds on earlier CSIS reporting (U#6) identifying US-origin chips inside Russian autonomous drones, adding Chinese engine failure as a second discrete supply-chain vulnerability in Russia's volume drone programme.